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Understanding Fringe Economic Behavior: A 
Bourdieusian-informed Meta-ethnography
Peter a. Kindle
The University of South Dakota
Mary a. caPlan
University of Georgia
This paper is a meta-ethnography of four low-income communi-
ties in order to explore fringe economic behaviors. Rejecting the 
interpretation of fringe economic behaviors as irrational, we affirm 
these behaviors as viable alternatives for people marginalized in 
the mainstream economy. Using a meta-ethnographic method and 
employing the concepts of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, we identify 
the habitus and social capital values of each community as distinct 
Bourdieusian fields and conclude that an awareness of the local-
ized development of a fringe economic cluster with distinct goals 
and rules undermines one-size-fits-all social welfare programs.
Key words: meta-ethnography, social capital, economic security, 
financial stress
Evidence suggests that the social work profession’s 
embrace of cultural competence as an ethical issue (Code, 2008) 
and practice competency (CSWE, 2008) has not been fully ex-
tended toward socioeconomic and class differences. Hodge 
(2003) noted a lack of research on social class while document-
ing substantial value differences between social work profes-
sionals and the working and middle classes. More recently, 
Strier, Feldman, and Shdaimah’s (2010) content analysis of 50 
social work introductory textbooks argued that the profession 
“has overlooked or even denied the relevance of social class” 
(p. 406). To the extent that socioeconomic and class differenc-
es may be under-represented in the social work literature, we 
offer a partial corrective in our focus on those marginalized 
from the mainstream economy. This paper is a first attempt 
to describe the contours of economic behaviors outside of the 
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mainstream and relies upon ethnographic studies in the hope 
that greater depth of understanding of these economic behav-
iors may provide a foundation for theory building and policy 
formulations.
Economic sectors outside of the mainstream economy 
include the fringe economy and the informal economy. In the nar-
rowest sense, the fringe economy is a synonym for alternative 
financial services (i.e., payday lenders, check cashiers, rent-
to-own stores, buy here–pay here used car dealers, and tax 
refund lenders) that serve as a legitimate and regulated preda-
tory barrier to full participation in the mainstream economy 
(Karger, 2005; Rivlin, 2010). In contrast, the informal economy 
has been described as “a process of income-generation … un-
regulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social en-
vironment in which similar activities are regulated” (Castells 
& Portes, 1989, p. 12). However, the distinction between fringe 
economy and informal economy is not relevant to this study, 
because the fringe and informal economies share some of the 
same customers (people with low incomes) and geographies 
in an economically developed nation like the United States 
(Karger, 2007; Mann, 2012; McMillian, 2012). 
The fringe economy, narrowly defined, cannot be under-
stood in isolation from the informal economy because of the 
extensive social, geographical, and economic affinities that are 
shared. Accordingly, the use of fringe economy in this paper is 
intentionally an expansion of the term to include the informal 
economy in order to emphasize the marginalization of people 
excluded from the mainstream economy (Figure 1). In com-
parison to the mainstream economy, the fringe, so understood, 
has less social legitimization and greater affinity toward sec-
ondary and tertiary labor markets (legal, but characterized by 
low wages, few benefits, short tenures, and inadequate career 
pathways), means-tested social welfare, reliance on charita-
ble services, illicit employment (employment that would be 
legal if employer and employee complied with all regulatory 
requirements), and illegal activities (Dohan, 2003). The main-
stream economy is supported and maintained by formal legal 
structures (law enforcement, courts, contract law); however, 
the fringe economy, except for alternative financial services, is 
supported and maintained by informal social structures that 
are geographically bounded (Dohan, 2003; Sherman, 2009; 
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Kotarba, and Fackler (2010), we understand the financial 
behaviors of people in the fringe economy to be viable al-
ternatives to mainstream avenues of acquiring social capital 
and income. Fringe economic behaviors are neither irrational 
(counter to the thought of most behavioral economists, e.g., 
Camerer, Lowewenstein, & Rabin, 2004) nor uninformed, as 
the Financial Literacy and Education Commission assumes 
(FLEC, 2011). We reject understandings of fringe economic 
behavior based on interpretations of these behaviors as defi-
cient and assert that fringe economic behaviors are rational, 
adaptive, and protective from the perspective of people who 
intersect with this sector of the economy. We contend that un-
derstanding fringe economic behaviors is a prerequisite to es-
tablishing anti-poverty programs and policies that will lead 
to self-sufficiency and greater participation in the mainstream 
economy.
It has been suggested that the work of French sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu is relevant to the complex social issues that 
define the field of social work (Garrett, 2007a, 2007b). Bourdieu’s 
work consistently emphasizes the dynamic interplay between 
social structures and social actors, and this “primacy of rela-
tions” defines social reality (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 
15). This theoretical analysis deepens social work’s core frame 
of human behavior in the social environment by asserting that 
there are human behaviors in social environments. 
Bourdieu proposes three concepts that are fundamental 
to understanding how individuals cope with imposed social 
structures: habitus, field, and social capital. To Bourdieu, field 
refers to a social space in which interrelationships are struc-
tured through competition for various forms of capital (i.e., 
power in the form of economic capital, cultural capital, social 
capital, and symbolic/moral capital) and in which the rules of 
the game (or habitus) are constructed and creatively engaged 
by the individual. Habitus is constituted by individual action 
and is “creative, inventive, but within the limits of its struc-
tures, which are the embodied sedimentation of the social 
structures which produced it (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 
19).” Accordingly, habitus escapes the determinism that rigid 
social structures might impose on the individual, yet provides 
form to subjective interpretations of social expectations within 
a specific field. Quoting Houston (2002), Garrett insists that 
“habitus acts as a very loose set of guidelines permitting us to 
strategize, adapt, improvise or innovate in response to situa-
tions as they arise” (2007a, p. 229). 
These concepts can help us understand the fringe econom-
ic behaviors of persons-in-the-fringe-economy-environments 
that inform our perspective (Garrett, 2007a, 2007b). We suggest 
that fringe economies can be understood as Bourdieusian 
fields, and that, accordingly, an understanding of fringe eco-
nomic behavior must be built upon inquiry into the field-spe-
cific goals associated with these behaviors (i.e., various forms 
of capital accumulation) and field-specific rules of the game 
(Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). 
One caveat should be emphasized. We understand 
Bourdieu’s concepts in a manner consistent with Emirbayer 
and Johnson (2008), in which a Bourdieusian field is not 
static, but rather is “a dynamism of potential innovation and 
a motor for ceaseless change” (p. 17). The potential within 
a Bourdieusian field stems from the competitive interplay 
between forces seeking to conserve the existing distribution of 
capital and forces acting to redistribute the various forms of 
capital. Therefore, the discussion of fringe economic behaviors 
that follows is intentionally descriptive rather than norma-
tive and emphasizes the innovative adaptations constructed 
within a fringe field to counterbalance marginalization from 
the mainstream. 
Our goals follow the first two levels of Lum’s (2007) frame-
work for culturally competent practice by advancing aware-
ness and knowledge of fringe economic values and behaviors. 
An understanding of behaviors within specific contexts can 
lead to development of theory, more effective interventions, 
and policy innovations to desegregate the fringe and the 
mainstream. Our research question is as follows: What can we 
learn about fringe economic values and behaviors by using a 
Bourdieusian lens to synthesize fringe ethnographies?
Method
Noblit and Hare (1988) developed the meta-ethnogra-
phy as an interpretivist method for researchers to synthesize 
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qualitative research. Meta-ethnography has been evaluated 
to be a useful tool to draw out patterns from multiple ethno-
graphic accounts, allowing researchers to extract further find-
ings of studies in relationship to each other or under a new lens 
(Campbell et al., 2011). This is considered to be the most sophis-
ticated method for synthesizing qualitative research (Britten et 
al., 2002). It has been used in the medical and nursing fields to 
further understand ethnographic accounts on the same subject 
(see Feder, Hutson, Ramsay, & Taket, 2006). In the case of this 
paper, the lens consists of the Bourdieusian concepts of field, 
habitus, and social capital. Our method followed Noblit and 
Hare’s 1998 seven-step framework.
The motivation for this study was rooted in the disserta-
tion research of the co-authors (Caplan, 2013; Kindle, 2009) 
and fueled by Karelis (2007), who argued that economic de-
cision matrices for poverty are distinctly different from those 
of the affluent. The search for empirical evidence relevant to 
Karelis’ arguments resulted in the discovery of a small number 
of book-length ethnographies of high quality. 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for selection of source eth-
nographies relied heavily on our subjective assessment of the 
depth of analysis, rich detail, and diversity provided across 
each study. Because the primary focus of this study is to enrich 
our understanding of fringe economic behaviors in a specific 
social setting, the ethnographers had to commit significant 
attention to the economics of daily life in such a setting, but 
co-residence for a year with the research participants was 
also considered an important criteria. Excellent studies were 
omitted because of a narrow focus on a segment of the popula-
tion instead of a community (Duneier, 1999; Edin & Lein, 1997), 
and high quality journalistic accounts without a community 
focus were also omitted (Ehrenreich, 2001; Shipler, 2004). 
The ethnographies selected were appraised for quality in 
a manner consistent with Toye, Seers, Allcock, Briggs, Carr, 
Andrews, and Baker (2013) that demands conceptual clarity 
and interpretative rigor. We make no claim for exhaustive 
or comprehensive coverage in the selection of Dohan (2003), 
Sherman (2009), and Venkatesh (2006); however, we do believe 
that these three selections are illustrative of the rich variety of 
social capital and habitus operative within fringe fields and 
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are, therefore, a reasonable starting place from which to under-
stand fringe economic behaviors. 
Three ethnographic studies of pseudonymous settings 
form the basic source material for our analysis. Venkatesh 
(2006) spent part of eight years with the residents of Maquis 
Park, an inner city, African American neighborhood in south 
Chicago. Sherman (2009) lived for a year in Golden Valley, a 
small, White, rural community in northern California experi-
encing economic hardship and isolation. Dohan (2003) spent 
two years researching distinctly different Mexican barrios in 
California—Guadalupe and Chávez. The first was a first-gen-
eration Mexican immigrant community in San Jose, and the 
second was a second- and third-generation Mexican American 
neighborhood in East Los Angeles. Each book was read mul-
tiple times with detailed notes taken on each reading. Reviews 
written by the first author were published for two of the eth-
nographies (Kindle, 2011, 2012). 
Data analysis followed Creswell’s (2007, pp. 150-155) 
spiral analogy that begins with comparing and contrasting the 
source materials, extrapolating key ideas, recursively question-
ing the preliminary conclusions, and developing the emerg-
ing themes. Preliminary results were presented at the Annual 
Program Meeting of the Council on Social Work Education, 
and substantial attendee feedback was received (Caplan & 
Kindle, 2011). 
Through the iterative and recursive data analysis process, 
many different grids were developed comparing and con-
trasting the characteristics of the four fields reported on in 
our source materials. Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, 
and social capital (Garrett, 2007a, 2007b) were the organizing 
framework for translating the studies into one another.
Table 1 summarizes the synthesis of the source materials 
that are explained in substantial detail in the Results below. 
This paper is an attempt to express the synthesis for the first 
time.
Results
For the purposes of our study, the pseudonymous commu-
nities of Maquis Park, Golden Valley, Guadalupe, and Chávez 
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are considered individual and distinct Bourdieusian fields. 
Our analysis will answer the following questions: “What are 
the various forms of capital that serve as goals of fringe eco-
nomic behavior?” and “What are the rules of the game (or 
habitus) that operate in each field?” Table 1 provides a conve-
nient comparison of each field.
Table 1: Comparison of Bourdieusian Fields 
Maquis Park Golden Valley Guadalupe Chavez
Social and 
Moral Capital 
Goals
Household 
stability 
Neighborhood 
safety
Traditional 
gender roles
Upward 
economic 
mobility in 
Mexico
Upward 
economic 
mobility in 
America 
Acceptable 
Forms of 
Underground 
Income 
Generation
Safety net 
receipts
Unreported 
wages 
Vice (some 
discomfort)
Ghettoware
Housemates
Space usage
Money lending
Hustling
Regulating/
Mediating
Informal work
Subsistence 
activities
Spousal 
employment
Family 
assistance
Unemployment
Disability
Charity
Low-wage 
work
Illicit day labor
Overwork
Flea markets 
Barrioware
Family 
assistance
Career work
Strategic 
welfare
Balanced 
hustling
Family 
assistance
Non-monetary 
Forms of 
Currency
Reciprocity and 
Mutuality Reputation Work
Work with 
Opportunity
Unacceptable 
Forms of 
Income 
Generation
Greed
Drugs
Predation
Welfare
Food stamps
Illegal activity 
(drugs)
Relocation
Welfare
Illegal activities 
not endorsed 
by legalization
Dead end work
Rules of the 
Game
Permeable 
boundaries
Balance 
legitimate and 
illicit
Reciprocity
Mutuality
Don’t take 
more than your 
share
Appeal to 
outsiders only 
as last resort
Gendered 
distinctions
Individualism 
Self-sufficiency 
Manual labor 
Family first
Earn your own 
way
Moral 
foundation of 
adulthood is 
work
Family first
Local preferred 
over outsider
Legalization 
through 
employer 
facilitation
Moral 
foundation of 
adulthood is 
work
Family first
Local preferred 
over outsider
Porous 
boundaries
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Maquis Park
Venkatesh (2006) provided an exceptionally rich descrip-
tion of the underground economic activity in this poor, urban, 
and African American community. Comprising 10 blocks on 
the south side of Chicago, Maquis Park was a stereotypical 
inner city ghetto. Middle- and upper-class African Americans 
had largely fled the community that was dominated by a low-
income housing complex where economically vulnerable fam-
ilies subsisted on less than $10,000 a year. Jobs were scarce; 
youth gang activity was extensive; and home-owners were 
likely outnumbered by the homeless. Single parent house-
holds were the norm.
From a Bourdieusian perspective, the social institutions 
that comprised Maquis Park were the local street gang, the 
local churches whose congregants resided in the community, 
the households that were commonly headed by women, the 
commercial sector, and the block club which developed local 
leadership to cope with the presence of gangs. These social in-
stitutions were indigenous to the field, and the competition for 
social and moral capital within the field took place primarily 
in these institutions. Other institutions served as forms of re-
source support or external constraint but were not bound by 
the field-specific expectations. These included law enforce-
ment, social services and related agencies, outsiders support-
ing the gang-sponsored drug trade, and even churches with 
congregants who lived outside the community.
Concern for financial stability and security by Maquis 
Park residents influenced the shape of the social and moral 
capital goals they pursued and the socially acceptable means 
by which they pursued them. Two mutually reinforcing goals 
can be identified: household stability and neighborhood safety. 
Each of these goals depended on establishing and maintain-
ing substantial levels of social and moral capital in Maquis 
Park against a backdrop of illegal and predatory gang activ-
ity; however, it is essential to recognize that the gang members 
were Maquis Park insiders. The gang itself was a legitimate 
institution in the fringe setting, even if all gang activities were 
not because the gang members were from the neighborhood. 
Constraints on gang activities depended almost entirely on the 
social and moral influence that the other community insiders 
could bring to bear in negotiations with the gang leader. 
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Householders tended to place their primary focus on 
household financial stability based on establishing reli-
able financial supports by cobbling together legitimate 
employment, safety net resources, and illicit income genera-
tion. For householders, neighborhood safety was a strong sec-
ondary focus. Neighborhood safety was defined by the social-
ly-sanctioned usage of public space for recreation, commerce, 
and "hot spots" where illicit and illegal activities were permit-
ted. Clergy invested considerable energy mediating agree-
ments and disputes related to neighborhood safety and the 
use of public space. The commercial district included business 
entrepreneurs and street hustlers who valued and relied upon 
an intricate network of personal connections that sustained 
access to customers, public space, and credit. Street hustlers 
seemed to provide an important role as regulators of public 
space use. In summary, “the manner of earning income and the 
ways of regulating it are both outside the societal mainstream” 
(Venkatesh, 2006. p. 382).
Within the environs of Maquis Park, residents’ efforts 
to maintain their livelihood often came into direct conflict 
with their values: “Because the underground economy plays 
such a key role in bringing resources into the home, house-
hold members are often caught between their desires to live a 
just life and their needs to make ends meet as best they can” 
(Venkatesh, 2006, p. 61). The social boundaries between legal 
employment and illicit and illegal income generation were 
permeable. Steady jobs were scarce, and virtually no stigma 
was associated with reliance on safety net resources. The in-
adequacy of the safety net led householders to supplement 
their incomes in myriad illicit or illegal ways. Clergy brokered 
day care and domestic work that generated unreported wages. 
Virtually any personal skill or personal asset was converted 
into "ghettoware"—foodstuffs, homemade clothing, counsel-
ing and psychic services, social security cards, hairstyling, hair 
care products, pirated movies, kitchen supplies, resumes, tax 
returns, gambling venues, party space, handicrafts, and artistic 
products. Automobiles became unlicensed taxis; spare rooms 
and even couches were leased. The financial stability of the 
household was paramount, and it took considerable creativity 
to generate sufficient household income to achieve this goal. 
Even participation in the sex trade, despite some discomfort 
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among some of the women in the community, did not result in 
ostracism. Female solidarity was too important to sustaining 
any level of neighborhood safety. The material foundation for 
the field’s moral capital did not follow the contours of conven-
tional morality, and this moral flexibility represented a signifi-
cant field-based adaptation in Maquis Park.
The commercial sector in Maquis Park was as unconven-
tional as the income-generating activities of the household-
ers. Conventional business credit was rarely obtained, which 
created a setting in which the personal networks were essen-
tial. Linkages between legitimate businesses and the illicit 
activities included unreported employment or sales, using 
backroom space for illegal activities (e.g., gambling, prostitu-
tion, or weapon storage), and money lending. These activities, 
however, did not take place without constraint. Both business 
owners and street hustlers abided by socially sanctioned codes 
of conduct that undergirded economic behaviors. Every com-
mercial transaction, whether legitimate or illicit, contained an 
expectation of reciprocity because “men and women see their 
own chances of [economic] success as predicated on their ca-
pacity to bring others along with them” (Venkatesh, 2006, p. 
103). Participants in the commercial sector understood that 
financial feasibility required cooperation more than compe-
tition. The expectation of reciprocity was a major constraint 
on participation in some illegal activities, because few were 
willing to be that closely associated with the worst of the gang 
behaviors. This formed the basis for another adaptation—a 
degree of mutuality in Maquis Park that is not typical of main-
stream exchange.
It would be a mistake to understand commerce in the 
Maquis Park fringe as a monetary economy. Reciprocal net-
works of obligation and favors were the currency that mattered 
most, so the material foundation for competition for social and 
moral capital was measured by fidelity to the expectations of 
reciprocity and mutuality. “The cash economy abuts a world 
where trading and payment occur through verbal promises, 
in-kind payments, and barter … [that comprise] highly intimate 
exchange networks, where personal connections and imper-
sonal contractual exchanges coexist” (Venkatesh, 2006, p. 93). 
Failure to abide by the informal rules of commerce, whether by 
a business owner or a street hustler, could easily result in the 
Fringe Economic Behavior 59
loss of social and moral capital, social isolation, and absence of 
willing transactional partners that would threaten household 
financial stability. 
Accordingly, the fringe economy in Maquis Park was an 
intricate network of interlocking obligations. Idealization of 
this reciprocity and mutuality as some form of charitable com-
passion is contrary to reality. Every participant had to contrib-
ute something to this web of expectations, regardless of the 
dearth of resources or limited capacities he or she possessed. 
By contributing, one gained social and moral capital in the 
community. 
Golden Valley
Far from the inner city of Maquis Park, Sherman (2009) 
lived for a year in a White, rural town in northern California 
suffering “rapid industrial decline, severe job loss, and persis-
tent poverty” (p. 2) due to the cessation of timbering to protect 
the spotted owl. Two-thirds of the residents had annual house-
hold incomes under $30,000, which put most at or below the 
poverty line. About 30 percent of the adults were unemployed, 
78 percent were married or cohabitating, and 88 percent had 
children. Most jobs were either seasonal or temporary.
From a Bourdieusian perspective, ethnic, cultural, and 
economic homogeneity among the 2,000 residents eliminated 
most of the determinants (e.g., income, position, wealth, and 
education) of social capital except for the symbolic. The resi-
dents of Golden Valley “rely heavily on moral concepts and 
moral discourses to make sense of their lives, to create and 
sustain a sense of success, and to configure their social worlds” 
(Sherman, 2009, p. 3). Foundational to their sense of moral 
capital is their commitment to this place, despite the financial 
hardships. Living in Golden Valley meant separation from the 
competitive aspirations of the suburban middle class and the 
complexities of ethnic and racial diversity. Competition for 
moral capital was anchored in a form of rural exceptionalism 
in which family came before finances and White country folk 
eschewed the welfare, drug use, and crime they associated 
with ethnic urbanism. Despite the prejudice supported by this 
form of rural exceptionalism, the social cohesion and sense 
of community in Golden Valley represented significant social 
capital, often demonstrated by local charity, extended family 
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care, and other forms of direct material assistance.
Moral capital within this Bourdieusian field was highly 
gendered and traditional. Adjacent to a national forest, the 
local culture valued the mythology of individualism, self-
sufficiency, and work in the form of manual labor. “[W]orking 
poverty has been a fact of life in Golden Valley for genera-
tions,” although “unemployed poverty has long been unac-
ceptable” (Sherman, 2009, p. 57). Closure of the last lumber 
company resulted in massive male unemployment, but this 
did little to de-stigmatize safety net resources. For men, subsis-
tence work such as hunting, fishing, cutting one’s own wood, 
raising animals, gardening, and gold/gemstone mining was 
preferable to any other means of coping with job loss. It mat-
tered less that one had little than that one had earned what-
ever one had. Having a reputation as a hard worker and good 
provider, even if only through subsistence activities, was the 
primary means for male accumulation of moral capital, and 
moral capital could become economic capital. “Those who are 
perceived as having lower moral worth are often denied access 
to the community’s increasingly rare jobs, as well as to many 
forms of community-level charity” (Sherman, 2009, p. 65). The 
currency of the fringe economy in Golden Valley was a reputa-
tion for working hard. 
In declining order, it was somewhat acceptable to cope 
with poverty through spousal employment, family assistance, 
or the receipt of unemployment benefits or disability pay-
ments. The association of unemployment and disability with 
earlier work efforts made them acceptable; however, under no 
circumstances was it acceptable to receive welfare (TANF or 
food stamps) or to participate in drug activities as a seller or 
user. Ironically, illegal poaching on federal land did not carry 
the same stigma as illegal drug activity in Golden Valley. Even 
federal park rangers were complicit in permitting this fringe 
economic activity. Although bartering was common in Golden 
Valley, Sherman (2009) does not mention the presence of a flea 
market for informal exchange comparable to Maquis Park’s 
ghettoware.
Female moral capital was related to the maintenance of a 
functional and stable family. Although Sherman (2009) goes to 
great lengths to show that traditional, family values have never 
been the norm in Golden Valley, that mythology dominated 
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the moral order. The pathways to accumulating moral capital 
for women, at least until they entered the labor market, were: 
(a) creating a stable home where children are safe; (b) placing 
restrictions on substance abuse, drinking, and domestic vio-
lence; and (c) focusing free time on family activities instead of 
individual pursuits. 
Guadalupe and Chávez
Dohan (2003) conducted his fieldwork in two distinctly 
different Mexican barrios in southern California. He spent 
almost a year in Guadalupe, a community of first-generation 
Mexican immigrants in San Jose, and another year in Chavéz, 
a community of U.S-born Mexican Americans in East Los 
Angeles. Most residents of Guadalupe were undocumented, 
and employment opportunities included positions as janitors, 
landscapers, and home healthcare workers in nearby Silicon 
Valley. Over 20 percent of the residents had incomes under the 
poverty line. Chavéz, in contrast, mimicked Maquis Park with 
an active youth gang, significant public drug activity, public 
housing, and a poverty rate over 50 percent.
Dohan’s (2003) analysis of the social institutions that 
shaped the Bourdieusian field for each community focused on 
the informal social networks that determined attitudes toward 
legitimate employment, indigenous organizations that includ-
ed illicit income-generating activities (street corner day labor 
sites, flea markets, and gangs), and the welfare subcultures 
that permitted a reluctant justification for the use of safety net 
resources. Chavéz mimicked Maquis Park in the inclusion of 
the gang as a legitimate social institution without endorsing 
all gang activities.
In both communities, work was “an organizing principle 
for their home and social life” (Dohan, 2003, p. 66). Work was 
the primary means of garnering social capital, and any form of 
aid that was not familial or work-related (i.e., welfare) eroded 
one’s social capital. Perhaps the most important value in each 
field was based on the understanding that adulthood meant 
to desire and contribute to household finances through em-
ployment. Despite the poverty in Guadalupe and the persis-
tent poverty in Chavéz, residents were not driven to merely 
survive. Instead they “focused their economic activities on 
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the problem of advancement” (Dohan, 2003, p. 97). The daily 
economic life in both Guadalupe and Chavéz was dominated 
by the fringe, yet the aspirations for economic advancement 
complemented mainstream economic goals. In different ways, 
the drive for advancement undergirded each barrio’s rationale 
for integrating “illegal activities into everyday community 
life” (p. 13). “Guadalupe and Chavéz did not lack the social 
organization to rebuff crime; rather, their social organization 
included crime and its associated institutions” (p. 153). 
Guadalupe. Comprised of Mexican nationals who had im-
migrated to the United States to pursue economic opportuni-
ties unavailable in Mexico, the Bourdieusian field relevant to 
Guadalupe was shaped by immigration enforcement and a 
transnational context. Low-wage work was the only legitimate 
income-generating activity and the primary means of acquir-
ing social and economic capital in Guadalupe. Long hours at 
multiple low-wage jobs were the primary strategies for eco-
nomic advancement, and were justified by “the value of the 
dollar conferred by transnationality” (Dohan, 2003, p. 91). This 
kind of overwork made sense, because residents of Guadalupe 
intended to return eventually to Mexico. The shadow of immi-
gration enforcement resulted in the community’s disapproval 
of most illegal activities, as well as significant stigmatization of 
any form of welfare receipt. With the exception of employers, 
engagement with social institutions outside of the field was 
always risky and was discouraged. 
Illicit employment without legal documentation to work 
in America was legalized in Guadalupe through employer fa-
cilitation (hiring without documents or acceptance of obvious 
forgeries as adequate), ready access to forged documents, 
and social networks that knew which employers would help. 
Street corners for day laborers provided access to facilitating 
employers, and informal flea markets where Maquis Park-like 
"barrioware" could be traded provided both income-generat-
ing opportunities and access to low-cost commodities. Illicit 
activities in Guadalupe that were sanctioned included work 
without documentation, selling without a business license, 
false documentation, and purchasing products that had been 
acquired through theft. 
Chavéz. The U.S.-born Mexican-American residents of this 
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community rejected the overwork strategy for economic ad-
vancement embraced in Guadalupe, but tended to understand 
social capital in economic terms. In Chavéz, work was equally 
valued, but included “an expectation of upward mobility” 
(Dohan, 2003, p. 68). Dead-end jobs without career pathways 
and escalating wage opportunities were of little interest to the 
residents who self-consciously distinguished themselves from 
communities like Guadalupe, where even dead-end jobs were 
valued. Accordingly, social capital in Chavéz did not accrue 
to the worker without an evaluation of the quality and nature 
of the employment. Low-wage work that required little more 
than punctuality and that provided little more than unreliable 
hours, fluctuating paychecks, negligible security, and safety 
risks could result in a loss of social capital in the community, 
especially if that employment did not provide economic access 
to commodities out of reach to other residents. Social capital 
was closely associated with a material base and resulted in a 
porous boundary between legal and illegal activities. 
Because jobs that paid a living wage were scarce in Chavéz, 
and because the residents rejected overwork as a reasonable 
pathway to economic advancement, alternative financial 
strategies were common. As in Maquis Park, residents wove 
a personal and complex financial strategy from the variety of 
legitimate, illicit, and illegal income-generating opportunities 
in Chavéz. For men, the dominant strategy was "hustling" or 
illicit and illegal “flexible earning strategies” (Dohan, 2003, p. 
71). Opportunities for profits from hustling may have been in-
frequent and unpredictable for most; however, the short-lived 
profits could be spectacular, especially in the drug trade. With 
the exception of the local gang, hustling was not a “whole way 
of life; it was merely the logic behind everyday decisions … 
made in pursuit of economic opportunities” (p. 82) and “rep-
resents one sensible economic strategy for people struggling 
to satisfy high expectations for success in an environment of 
poor opportunities” (p. 221). For women, welfare provided an 
alternative strategy, despite the stigma as “residents familiar 
with the routine of public assistance know that welfare checks 
arrived with relative certainty … and left time to gain addi-
tional income through unreported work” (p. 74). 
A sense of balance was central to the justification of 
illicit, illegal, and welfare income generation in Chavéz. Each 
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opportunity to increase income had to be carefully weighed 
against the risks, and the risks were mitigated by the local gang. 
The local gang concentrated on automobile thefts and drug 
distribution, thereby leaving other petty crime to the residents, 
and provided some monitoring of outside law enforcement 
for the benefit of all illicit activities in the community. Career 
aspirations, flexible earning strategies, and segmentation of 
illegal/illicit earning opportunities, when joined with gang 
oversight, created a lower risk environment for fringe eco-
nomic behaviors.
Discussion
Fringe economic clusters like Guadalupe, Chavéz, Golden 
Valley, and Maquis Park arise from the failure of the main-
stream economy to meet the financial needs and aspirations 
of the residents. Secondary and tertiary labor markets do not 
often provide the income stability foundational to household 
economic advancement (e.g., Chavéz), and legitimate safety 
net resources are woefully deficient when work is not available 
(e.g., Golden Valley and Maquis Park). The legal and social 
fabric that sustains the mainstream economy (e.g., banking, law 
enforcement, courts, and contracts) is inadequate to that task 
in a fringe cluster. Marginalization from the economic main-
stream leads inevitably to the construction of a fringe cluster 
with localized and informal institutions, social norms, and 
socially-approved aspirations that we have interpreted to be 
Bourdieusian fields. Maquis Park, Golden Valley, Guadalupe, 
and Chavéz clearly demonstrate the great variability in fringe 
adaptations apart from the mainstream economy.
The mainstream-like aspirations for economic advance-
ment that dominate the quest for social capital in Guadalupe 
and Chavéz are virtually nonexistent in Golden Valley and 
are quite foreign to the daily striving for household stabil-
ity and neighborhood safety in Maquis Park. The traditional 
gender roles that defined moral capital in Golden Valley could 
not be more irrelevant to the female householders in Maquis 
Park, and in Chavéz and Guadalupe, the value placed on ex-
tended family networks was subsumed within the work-first 
pursuit of economic advancement. The unique forms of social 
and moral capital that were most valued in each field helped 
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define the habitus that determined socially-approved and dis-
approved forms of income generation. Attitudes toward em-
ployment, illicit work, illegal activities, and welfare receipts 
differed in each community as well.
Each fringe cluster created its own customizable safety net 
from the various income-generating possibilities available. 
No field rejected legitimate forms of employment; however, 
Chavéz residents did redefine “legitimate” to include the pos-
sibility of advancement. The stigmatization of welfare receipt 
varied greatly in the communities, from the near absence of 
stigma in Maquis Park to an extreme form of welfare rejec-
tion in Golden Valley. Chavéz differed from Guadalupe in the 
degree of justification for single/abandoned mothers to use 
welfare. Acceptance of welfare in Chavéz did not carry the 
high social costs associated with welfare receipt in Guadalupe. 
Each field informally legitimized some forms of illegal 
or illicit activity, but no field embraced illegality without 
limits. Guadalupe and Golden Valley were the least recep-
tive to illegal activities; however, both accepted certain forms 
of illegal behavior in pursuit of the social capital most valued 
in that field. Guadalupe legitimized false papers as necessary 
to find employment, and Golden Valley supported poaching 
as an appropriate response to unemployment. In compari-
son to these fields, Chavéz and Maquis Park seemed to have 
a broader embrace of illegality; however, both had limits. In 
Maquis Park, the reciprocity required by participating in ex-
changes set distinct boundaries on illegal activities because 
few were willing to become obligated to the local gang. In 
Chavéz, the local gang’s monopoly on automobile theft and 
drugs also constrained some behaviors. 
We conclude that each field developed organically from 
the local economic conditions, despite sharing in the broader 
political economy. The residents of each community devel-
oped unique adaptations in order to thrive. The tacit knowl-
edge required to safely negotiate the hot spots and gang activ-
ity in Chavéz and Maquis Park would be of little use in Golden 
Valley or Guadalupe. A reputation for hard physical labor may 
have been equally valued in Guadalupe and Golden Valley, but 
was viewed with distain in Chavéz unless it generated oppor-
tunity and economic advancement. The relationships essential 
to financial survival in Maquis Park were as nontransferable as 
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the reputations in Golden Valley. 
We further conclude that an awareness of the localized de-
velopment of a fringe economic cluster with distinct goals and 
rules undermines the establishment of one-size-fits-all social 
programs. Guadalupe and Golden Valley would be unlikely 
to benefit from improvements in formal safety net programs 
because these programs were outside the local habitus, but in-
creased redistribution of resources through safety net programs 
would find ready acceptance in Maquis Park. An increase in 
the minimum wage might be highly valued in Guadalupe, but 
neither Chavéz nor Golden Valley would care much about a 
higher minimum wage because Chavéz wanted quality jobs 
and Golden Valley had few jobs of any kind. 
Fringe economic behaviors differed in each community 
because each field was unique, but within each field, the eco-
nomic behaviors and regulations were adaptive social mecha-
nisms to structure social life in each community. Fringe eco-
nomic clusters cannot be reincorporated into the mainstream 
economy by something as simple as an injection of additional 
financial resources without a sensitivity to local conditions. 
Social development might theoretically create substantive 
numbers of jobs in the primary labor market, but this alone 
is unlikely to eliminate the local and informal adaptations. As 
Bourdieusian fields, fringe economic clusters have established 
informal mechanisms for social regulation of risk, unique 
forms of social capital, and different social expectations. Social 
programs aimed at moving fringe economic clusters toward 
the mainstream should begin with a higher level of respect for 
the complexities of economic life within each field.
This meta-ethnography of four distinct low-income com-
munities was conducted utilizing the concepts of sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu that were developed as he conducted his own 
ethnographic research (Bourdieu, 1990). Readers should note 
our interpretative slant as a potential limitation of this study, 
along with the obvious limitations associated with the small 
number of ethnographies included. Ethnographic research, 
although potentially providing rich insights, is subject to 
several limitations associated with researcher subjectivity and 
an absence of generalizability (Rubin & Babbie, 2011). In the 
four ethnographies included in this meta-ethnography, only 
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one community (Chavéz) was investigated by a researcher 
of the same ethnicity and immigration status as the subjects. 
Accordingly, an etic perspective should be assumed when 
interpreting these results. The meta-ethnographic attempt to 
construct generalizable results from research that is not de-
signed to be generalized is in itself a substantial limitation. 
Conclusion
In the mainstream economy, a financial decision is effec-
tive when made in the consumer’s “own financial interest” 
(Mandell, 2006, p. 2). This non-reflective imposition of an eco-
nomic maximization boundary on assessment of financial deci-
sion making permeates the literature on financial literacy, and 
judges all economic behavior as deficient that does not comply 
with economic maximization. This meta-ethnography suggests 
that economic maximization is a poor framework through 
which to understand economic behavior of people living on 
the fringe. Economic concerns were important in these four 
communities, but not without significant moral, value, and 
cultural accretions that together comprise Bourdieu’s social 
capital. Culturally competent social work practice with people 
living on the fringe must be informed about the locally con-
structed social expectations and social goals of the community. 
Social programs implemented without this awareness should 
expect to be ineffective and irrelevant to the lives of the people 
we intend to serve, as the mixed results of financial education 
programs seem to suggest (e.g., Gale, Harris, & Levine, 2012).
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